










natural  ends?  These  questions  pose  a  challenge,  because   the  predicates  “natural”  and “end” 
seemingly can not be instantiated at the same time – at least given some Kantian assumptions. 











in   natural   linguistic   expressions   of   the   judgments.   Such   teleological   terms   include 





























































My  argument   proceeds   in   the   following   steps.   In   Sec. 2,   I  will   briefly   examine  Kant’s 







themselves.  His   approach   is   cautious,   for   it   does   not   presuppose   a   realist   construal   of   the 
judgments under scrutiny. Realists take judgments to the effect that something is a natural end as 
assertions  of  matters  of   fact  or  as  factual,   for   short,   just  as   the  surface  structure  of   related 
linguistic statements – “X is a natural end” – suggests. They think that such assertions can hold 
true in a mind­independent way and do sometimes do so. Kant’s approach, instead, leaves the 








allow a realist  construal.  The reason  is   this:  Assume,  we are   to  explain  what   it   is   to   judge 










supports   the  obvious  answer  –  he   equates   judging   something  a  natural   end  with   “to   judge 
something that one cognizes [and thus judges] as a product of nature at the same time an end” 
4 See Düsing (1986) for a study on teleology and Kant’s notion of a world; McLaughlin (1990) for Kant’s CTJ and 








specification   in   this   respect   is   to   take  both   judgments   as   factual.  This,   then,   is   the  realist  
suggestion: To judge something a natural end is to assert that it is an end and to assert that it is 
natural.  “Natural end” would then function as a one­place predicate,  it would pick a class of 































































ways)   causes   the   flute   (O),   but   his   will   (his  moving   the   arms)   is   determined   by   Peter’s 
conception of the flute (C(O)). 








someone’s mind, not something like the general concept  of a chair,  say. That  this   is  Kant’s 
understanding is clear form the fact that Kant speaks of a will very shortly after his definition of 
ends in §10 (220/105).
An   important   question   is  what   the   determination   relation   in   the   elaborate   definition   is 
supposed to be. Kant does not explain that relation here, and, therefore, we just have to take 
Kant’s words and work with the everyday understanding of “determination”. 
The   elaborate   definition   is   compatible   with   Kant’s   first   shot,   if   both   definitions   use 
“causation” in slightly different senses.  This has already been indicated by using different arrow 
types in the diagrams. In the first shot (Diagram 1), “causation” it to be understood in a very 
broad  sense.  On  this  understanding,   a  cause  of  O  is   something   that  answers  why­questions 


















“Thus  where  not  merely   the  cognition  of  an object  but   the  object   itself   (its   form or   its 
existence) as an effect is thought of as possible only through a concept of the latter, there one 
thinks of an end” (§10/220/105). 
Here,  the   “where”­clause   obviously   contains   a   strengthening   of   the   definiens   in  Kant’s 






































































Kant   goes   on   to   consider   an   example  in  which  we   judge   an  O   possible   only   as   end 
(§64/370/242).  But  in  the example,  Kant notes,  O is an artifact  and not a product of nature 













an   end.  Kant   very   sketchily   indicates   an   answer:   The   pattern   of   causes   suggested   in   the 











He   starts  with   highlighting   the   “improper   and   indeterminate”   character   of   the   preliminary 
characterization  of  natural  ends   in   terms  of   self­causation;  a  “derivation  from a determinate 
concept” is promised (§65/372/244).




some   worries   that   concern   the   idea   of   self­causation,   which   prominently   figures   in   the 
preliminary  characterization  of  natural   ends.11  2.   It   prepares  Kant’s   final   characterization  of 
natural ends by introducing the notion of X being the final end of Y.12
After the remark, Kant derives  two conditions  on objects that are properly judged natural 
ends;   they   form  the   core  of   the  desired,  more  determinate   characterization  of   natural   ends 
(§65/373/244–5). In order to derive the conditions, Kant assumes the obvious answer and that the 
















































































































































The new reading solves the problems of the first  reading. Yet,  I  do not want to say that 
Kant’s argument is now entirely sound (see Sec. 6). 
5.2  The causal support condition
Let  me  now  discuss   the   second   condition  on  natural   ends,  viz.  CSC.  According   to   the 
condition, roughly, the parts cause each other. Here is Kant’s argument for CSC (§65/373/ 245): 
  “But   if  a  thing,  as a natural  product,   is  nevertheless   to contain  in  itself  and its   internal 
possibility a relation to ends, i.e., is to be possible only as a natural end and without the causality 
of the concepts of a rational being outside of it,  then it is required,  second,  that its parts be 
combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form. For in this way 






































































5.3 Whose concept is it?
Here is our problem again: Diagram 3 makes only sense, if we can assign the concept C(O) to 
some epistemic subject. It cannot be an artisan, for then the natural end would be an artifact. But 
who else can it be otherwise?17
There is still one person left who can do it. That is the judger. It is the judger’s concept of the 
whole that does the determining. This, in a nutshell, is Kant’s proposal. 




























The passage makes it clear that the concept C(O) does not determine an object out there in 
the world, but rather a cognition, as Kant puts it. This is also suggested in the following passage, 
in which Kant speaks of a body that must be thought of as a natural end:
“the concept of [...] [the particular body] would in turn be the cause (in a being that would 


























human heart  by  its   form,  by  its  weight,  by  its  position  within   the  human body etc.  This   is 
probably how the heart was thought of as for a long time. But for generalizations in biology we 




































make   an   assertion.   It   is   claimed   that   the  parts   of  O   cause  O   (CSC).  But   there   is   another 
component of Peter’s judgment. Kant does not quite make explicit what kind of mental event, 


















As   the  last  quote  makes  plain,  Kant  himself   suggests   that  an  analogy   is   crucial   for   the 
understanding of judging something a natural end. But, apparently, Kant struggles quite a bit in 






















parts  are  the   cause  of   the  object,  which  precisely   is  CSC.  The  other   condition   is   that   the 
commitment to a particular epistemic approach to proceed top­down is appropriate for the object 
under scrutiny. And, of course, the commitment to that approach is appropriate, if the approach 





























As we have seen, for a cogent argument, Kant’s preliminary characterization of natural ends 
for which real-world examples were given, has to be related to the final characterization. The 
preliminary characterization has it that 
“a thing exists  as a natural  end  if  it  is cause and effect of itself (although in a twofold 
sense)” (§64/370/243). 
For Kant’s argument, it is sufficient that the preliminary characterization implies the final 
one.18 Kant does not show this, but we may argue as follows: In some stretched sense, the parts 
of a thing may be thought of as that very thing. Now, in Diagram 3, the parts cause the whole, 
and,  thus,  in  the  stretched  sense,  the  thing  itself  (properly  speaking  its  parts)  is  its  cause. 
Moreover, according to Diagram 3, the concept of the thing determines the parts (the origin of 
the parts). So, if we forget a while that the concept of the thing is not the thing itself and that 
determination is not here causation, we may say that the thing (its parts) is also the effect of (is 
also determined by) the thing (its concept, to be precise). 
This way to relate the characterizations has two merits: First, it explains why Kant says the 
thing is its own cause and its effect. This seems redundant, because, per definition, if A is the 
cause of A, then A is also its effect. Kant, I think, says that the thing is its own cause and effect, 
since he has two relations in mind: The parts produce the whole; and the whole (its concept, 
properly speaking) determines the parts. Second, Kant’s remark in the brackets – “although in a 
twofold sense” (ibid.) – can now be made sense of as follows: We are really talking about two 
relations in which the objects stands to itself. One is causation, the other is determination. 
Another  interesting  question  is  how  the  phenomena  from  the  illustrations  with  the  tree 
instantiate the final characterization of natural ends. Unfortunately, one has to say that the final 
characterization  moves  away from the  three  respects  in  which  a  tree  causes  itself.  The first 
18 I take it that the preliminary characterization is supposed to be equivalent to E and not to NE.
18
illustration – reproduction –is not at all related to the final characterization, which exclusively 
focuses on one individual.19 The second illustration – growth – does not obviously concern parts 
and wholes, either. Only some phenomena mentioned in the third illustration – causal relations 
between the parts such that the whole thing is sustained, e.g. – instantiate in a way the pattern of 




Ginsborg   (2001,   2006)   has   pointed   out,   the   question   poses   a   challenge,   because   to   judge 
something   a   natural   end   seemingly   amounts   to   assert   inconsistent   propositions,   viz.   that 
something is a product of nature and that is has been produced through intentional action.














































interpretation   that  has  emerged  should  certainly  be  put   in  a   larger  perspective.  At   least   the 
following   two   questions   are   important   in   this   respect.   First,   Kant   obviously   thinks   that 
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